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Abstract
This paper presents a model of information aggregation in which individuals can draw
upon information from heterogeneous sources to improve decisions and then tests that
model using experimental data. In the experiment, Thai subjects observed the opinions
of Americans and other Thais that they could use to help them answer a series of general
knowledge questions. Despite listening too little to either group, subjects demonstrated a
signicant amount of statistical sophistication in how they weighed observed American in-
formation relative to observed Thai information. The data indicate that subjects understood
that outside information has extra value because people from the same group tend to make
the same kinds of mistakes. The results illustrate the importance of forming diverse groups
to solve problems.
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1 Introduction
Consider the situation faced by an economic agent who has to make a difcult decision, such
as the one faced by a farmer who has to decide whether to start using a new variety of seeds.
When the farmer makes her choice, she may feel condent enough to make the decision without
any advice. Alternatively, she may consider the advice she received from neighbors who have
experience using the seeds. Or she may decide that she wants to talk to someone from
outside her group, since an outsider may have a different experience. Her ability to make the
best decision will depend crucially on how much she listens to others, and on the diversity of
the opinions that she draws upon. This paper uses an experiment to explore how effectively
agents utilize a variety of different opinions to make decisions.
The model and experiment in this paper relate to, and expand upon, previous research into
information aggregation. It is distinct from much of that literature in that I am concerned with
the ability of individuals to aggregate information from a variety of different sources, while the
majority of the existing literature is concerned with the institutions that serve to accumulate indi-
vidual knowledge. For example, many theoretical and experimental papers have considered the
capabilities of auctions and other market institutions to aggregate private information through
the price mechanism (Hellwig, 1980; Plott and Sunder, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990;
Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 1997; Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 2000). An additional set of papers
has examined the potential for voting mechanisms to aggregate the information possessed by
individual voters (Lohmann, 1994; Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1997; Piketty, 1999).
While some papers have looked at the process by which individuals use their private infor-
mation and observed information to make decisions, most of this literature has been concerned
with issues relating to sequential decision-making or herding, and has used simple stimuli like
the urn-ball design (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Goeree et al. 2007; Kraemer, Noth, and Weber,
2006). In Anderson and Holt (1997), a subject has a private signal about which urn a ball
comes from, needing to use that information as well as observed decisions made by others to
make her own choice. Compared to previous research, my experiment uses a richer informa-
tional structure, leading to results that are more easily generalizable. Subjects use their own
private information, observed information from other members of their own group, and observed
information from members of a different group that has different expertise to answer a series of
general-knowledge questions. The design of the experiment makes it possible to test a variety
of hypotheses relating to how effectively subjects use the information that they observe to solve
problems.
The experimental design relates to a variety of real-world examples in which individuals
can use information to improve decisions. Information sharing within social networks has been
shown to inuence agricultural technology adoption, health decisions, and savings behavior, but
not always for the better.1 The research shows that individuals put high weight on information
learned from others within their own group and that information sharing between groups often
does not occur. Information sharing generally improves decision-making, but the lack of sharing
across groups sometimes leads entire groups to choose the wrong decision (Dearden, Pritchett,
and Brown, 2004). Would decision-making be improved if individuals had access to a variety
of different information sources? Are people generally able to aggregate a variety of different
opinions in an intelligent way? The controlled environment of the lab makes it possible to
answer yes to both of these questions. In fact, the experimental subjects show an implicit
appreciation for somewhat subtle statistical ideas when deciding how to weigh information from
a variety of different sources.
In the experiment, Thai subjects considered information that came from sources with differ-
ent cultural backgrounds. The subjects rst answered a series of general-knowledge questions
that had correct numerical answers. There were three types of questions: 1) questions about
Thailand, 2) questions about the US, and 3) questions about both Thailand and the US. After
1Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Duo, Kremer, and Robinson (2004), and Munshi (2004) explore how information
sharing affects technology adoption in India and Kenya. Dearden, Pritchett, and Brown (2004), Miguel and Kremer
(2004), and Munshi and Myaux (2002) describe how information sharing affects health decisions in developing
countries. Duo and Saez (2002) investigate how communication within social groups inuences participation in
retirement plans at an American university.
answering the questions on their own, subjects observed randomly selected answers given by
Americans and by other Thais, who had answered the same questions at an earlier date, that
they could use to help them revise their answers. By looking at how subjects changed their
answers, it is possible to estimate the weights that they applied to observed American answers,
to observed Thai answers, and to their own initial answers.
The data show that, even for the cases in which any one Thai answer is equally good as any
one American answer, an optimizing Thai should assign signicantly higher weight to American
answers than to other Thai answers. For example, Americans and Thais were about equally
good at answering the questions about both Thailand and the US. The data show that it was
still optimal for a Thai subject to put twice as much weight on observed American answers as on
observed Thai answers. This extra value comes from the fact that Americans tended to make
one kind of mistake and Thais tended to make a different kind of mistake. When members
of the same group tend to make the same kind of mistake, an agent has more to learn from
members of a different group than from other members of her own group.
In general, the subjects appeared to understand this idea, behaving optimally in how they
weighed American information relative to Thai information. Subjects achieved this optimal rel-
ative weighting despite listening too little to either group. Although they would have beneted
by listening more to both groups, subjects signicantly improved their performances by correctly
weighing observed American answers relative to observed Thai answers. Moreover, the pres-
ence of the questions about both Thailand and the US makes it possible to show that subjects
appreciated the extra value of an American's independent perspective to a Thai decision-maker.
Subject behavior in the experiment indicates that when agents listen to a diverse group of
opinions, they can be expected to carefully consider the available information. The issue of
concern is that those independent voices may not be heard at all, either because agents lack
access to outside information or because they put too much weight on their personal knowledge
and thus choose not to seek outside advice. Failures to use information effectively show that
groups make mistakes when all members think the same way and outside sources are not
consulted.2 As just one example, the Bay of Pigs asco occurred in large part because an
insulated group of decision-makers failed to consult independent experts in the CIA and State
Department (Janis, 1972; Surowiecki 2004).
For decision-makers to avoid these sorts of mistakes, the experiment conrms what the
anecdotal evidence suggests: access to a diverse set of information is essential. Subjects show
the cognitive ability to deal in a sophisticated way with information from a variety of sources.
Specically, subjects understand and can apply the idea of statistical dependence between the
mistakes that they make and that their other group members make to problem solving tasks.
At the same time, the experimental subjects are constrained by the excessive weight they give
to their own initial answers. Improving decision-making thus appears to primarily be about
reducing the overcondence and other causes behind the failure of decision-makers to access
independent perspectives. The experiment shows that, conditional on those voices being heard,
decision-makers can effectively learn from a variety of different opinions.
Section 2 describes the experimental design. In Section 3, I model the process of using
information to make decisions. Section 4 contains the summary statistics that describe the
distributions of American and Thai answers to the questions. In Section 5, I estimate the weights
subjects give to the information they observe and test a variety of hypotheses that explain that
behavior. Section 6 tests the hypothesis that subjects both understand that Americans and
Thais make different kinds of mistakes and apply this knowledge to their decisions. Section 7
describes how the experimental design makes it possible to test the hypothesis that subjects
appreciate the independence in outside information. Section 8 concludes.
2Other research has shown that people benet in a variety of ways from having a wide range of social contacts.
For example, knowing a diverse group of people helps with nding jobs and with psychological wellbeing (Granovet-
ter, 1973; Putnam, 2000). To borrow Granovetter's phrase, my results show that "the strength of weak ties" carries
over to problem-solving. The experimental results thus show another consequence of the decline in social capital
that Putnam (2000) describes. People without access to a diverse information set will make poor decisions.
2 Experimental Design
In the experiment, American students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
and Thai students from Thammasat University's Rangsit campus answered a series of general
knowledge questions in December 2003 and January 2004. Soon after that, separate groups
of Thai students from Thammasat's Bangkok campus and from the National Institute of Devel-
opment Administration (NIDA) answered the same questions. These students then observed
randomly selected answers, given by the MIT and Rangsit students, which they could use to
help them revise their answers.
2.1 The Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of fteen questions covering a range of topics. For example, one
question asked about the January temperature in Bangkok, the January temperature in Boston,
and the sum of those temperatures. Another question asked for the number of Thai prime
ministers since 1960, the number of American presidents since 1960, and the sum of those two
numbers. A third question asked about the number of Thai and American 25-29 year-olds with
some university education, as well as the sum of those two numbers. Figure 1 shows one of
the questions. The appendix contains all of the questions.
From 1961-1990, average
daily high temperature in
January in Boston
______ °C + ______ °C = ______ °C
Figure 1:  Sample question from the experiment
From 1961-1990, average
daily high temperature in
January in Bangkok
Sum
The design of these questions had two purposes. First, the goal was to generate questions
that Thais were likely to know better than Americans, questions that Americans were likely to
know better than Thais, and questions we might expect them to know equally well (and the
data conrm that this is the case for the sum questions). Second, the case in which subjects
see information about the sum question makes it possible to test the hypothesis that subjects
appreciate the independence in outside information.
For this reason, the presence of the sum questions is a key design feature in the experiment.
The intuition is that there are two pieces to the sum question: the Thai part and the American
part. As the data will show, Americans and Thais are equally good at answering the questions
about the sum. Still, Thais have more to learn from American answers about the sum question
because Americans know the piece of the puzzle about which Thai subjects generally have less
knowledge. I demonstrate these ideas formally in Section 7.
2.2 Stage 1: Creating a pool of American and Thai answers
In Stage 1 of the experiment, 116 introductory economics students at MIT and 130 introductory
economics students at Thammasat University's Rangsit campus answered the series of ques-
tions. Students had 15 minutes to answer the survey. In both countries, students answered the
questionnaire at the end of introductory economics classes. In Thailand, the questionnaire and
instructions were given in Thai. Each group answered the questions in the standard units pre-
vailing in their respective countries. For example, Americans answered temperature questions
in degrees Fahrenheit and Thais answered temperature questions in degrees Celsius.
Subjects received monetary rewards for answering accurately. For the American students,
the top three performers on the entire set of questions received $50 each and the top fteen
performers on some of the individual questions received $10 each. Among the Thai students,
the top ve performers on the overall questionnaire received 1000 baht (approximately $25) and
the top twenty on some of the individual questions received 200 baht. To determine the top
performers for each question, students were ranked according to the distance of their answers
from the correct answer. The additional rewards for the Thai students reected the larger
sample size. The rewards for the individual questions were included to ensure that students
who felt they had little chance of winning the overall awards still had sufcient incentive to try
hard to answer the questions well.
2.3 Stage 2: Showing American and Thai information to subjects
In Stage 2, 300 economics undergraduates at Thammasat's Bangkok campus and master's eco-
nomics students at the National Institute for Development Administration (NIDA) rst received
instructions in Thai. The instructions were read aloud by a native Thai speaker at the same
time that the subjects read the written instructions. Subjects were informed that they would re-
ceive 100 baht for participating and 20 baht for each question that they answered within a range
of the correct answer. The incentives were intended to provide subjects with the objective of
minimizing the mean-squared error (MSE) of their answers, while keeping the instructions as
simple as possible. In the initial instruction packet, subjects were not told that they would be
receiving additional information to help them choose their nal answers to the questions.
After the rst set of instructions had been read, subjects answered all of the questions
using Microsoft Excel in computer labs at NIDA and Thammasat. They directly answered the
Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions, and the sum was calculated from those answers.
After all subjects answered the questions, they received a second set of instructions.
Subjects were told that they would observe randomly selected answers from Thammasat-
Rangsit and MIT students who answered the same set of questions. The subjects were told
that their payments would be based on the nal answers that they gave after observing the
information. The randomly selected answers from other students were provided in a separate
packet. For each question, subjects saw the heading Answers from Thai students followed
by the Thai information, and then Answers from American students followed by the American
information. Figure 2 shows what one group of the Thai subjects saw for the question about
political leaders.
Since January 1, 1960,
number of American
presidents
______ + ______ = ______
1.    18
1.     7
2.     9
3.    10
Answers given by Thai students
Answers given by American students
Figure 2:  Sample of information that subjects observe
Since January 1, 1960,
number of Thai prime
ministers
Sum
The subjects in this group observed that one randomly selected Thai student thought the
number of American presidents was 18. They also observed that three randomly selected
American students thought the number of American presidents was 7, 9, and 10, respectively.
The selection of answers that subjects observed proceeded as follows: First, I randomly se-
lected whether subjects observed information about the Thailand questions, the US questions,
the sum questions, or all three. Second, I randomly chose how many Thai answers that sub-
jects observed (up to three). Third, I randomly chose how many Thai and American answers
that subjects observed. In the example in Figure 2, subjects observed 1 Thai answer and 3
American answers. Finally, I randomly selected which Thai and American answers that subjects
saw. Proceeding in this way yielded 20 sets of information that subjects could observe.
In total, each experimental session took approximately 50 minutes. I conducted 25 ses-
sions, 17 at Thammasat and 8 at NIDA. Payments averaged approximately 280 baht ($7) per
subject.
2.4 Controlling for anchoring
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that individuals will tend to stick to a number that is
given to them, even when that number is irrelevant to the question at hand, a phenomenon they
called anchoring. In my experiment, subjects rst answered the questions and then updated
their answers based on what they observed. Thus, anchoring presents a serious concern in this
experiment; a subject provided her own answer to which she can anchor and that number con-
tains meaning relevant to the task, unlike the random number which affected students' answers
in Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
Due to these concerns, an additional 42 students observed information and answered the
questions without rst providing their private beliefs. To test for anchoring, I compare these
students to the students in the main treatment group. The data show that anchoring had a
small and statistically insignicant effect on subject behavior in the experiment. Details on the
test for anchoring can be found in the appendix.
3 A Model of Information Aggregation
Here, I describe a model of information aggregation that shows how the Thai subjects should
weigh the information they see to minimize the mean-squared error (MSE) of their answers.
The model applies to each question type (Bangkok/Thailand, Boston/US, or sum) separately.
For a question q, take individual i in group j (either A for American or T for Thai), to have a
private belief xijq about the correct answer for the question.3 The MSE, 2jq, for a group j for
question q is then
2jq =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
(xijq   Truthq)2 ,
3The empirical results indicate that there are no signicant differences between individuals with different personal
characteristics (i.e. gender) or socioeconomic status in how they treat the information available to them (results
available upon request). Therefore, in the model, I will treat all subjects to have the same objective function.
where Nj is the number of group j members in the sample and Truthq is the correct answer for
question q. A group that is comparatively better at answering a question will have a lower MSE
for that question. The distributions of American and Thai answers give the MSE for Americans
and the MSE for Thais for each question q.
The group MSE can be broken down into estimators of the population variance for the group
(s2jq) and the squared group bias (2jq), where xjq is the mean answer given by group j for
question q.
Proposition 1 Where s2jq = 1Nj
NjX
i=1
(xijq   xjq)2 and 2jq = 1Nj
NjX
i=1
(xjq   Truthq)2, the MSE for
group j for question q can be expressed as
2jq = s
2
jq + 
2
jq
Proof. See the appendix.
This decomposition reects the fact that the total error made by the group consists of in-
dividual and group components. The individual component, s2jq, comes from the variation in
answers given by members of the same group. The group component, 2jq, comes from the
distance between the group mean and the correct answer.
Dene the fraction of a group's MSE that comes from group bias by jq:
jq =
2jq
2jq
If individuals in a group tend to make the same kind of mistake, jq will be high since group bias
will cause most of the group's MSE.
To analyze subject behavior, I focus on three parameters, averaged across questions: 1)
the American-to-Thai MSE ratio, 
2
A
2T
; which captures how accurately the Americans answer the
questions relative to Thais, 2) the American group bias share, A, which captures the share of
American MSE for which group bias is responsible, and 3) the Thai group bias share, T , which
captures the share of Thai MSE for which group bias is responsible.
Proposition 2 Where Q is the number of questions, the maximum-likelihood estimators (MLE)
for these three parameters are:
2A
2T
=
1
Q
QX
q=1
2Aq
2Tq
, A =
1
Q
QX
q=1
Aq, and T =
1
Q
QX
q=1
Tq.
Proof. See the appendix.
A subject who minimizes the expected MSE of her nal answer will weigh information accord-
ing to her perceptions of how good Americans are relative to Thais at answering the questions
and how much of each group's MSE comes from group bias. Her implicit perceptions of 
2
T
2A
, T ,
and A determine the average weights that she will apply to the information that she observes.
The actual values of the parameters determine what she would optimally do. Without loss
of generality, I ignore heterogeneity among Americans and heterogeneity among Thais. The
model can be expanded to accommodate this heterogeneity, and the average weights across
subjects are identical to the expressions derived below. For the sake of simplicity, the model
assumes that subjects treat each American answer that they see in the same way and each
Thai answer that they see in the same way, for any given question. As will be discussed, the
regression used to estimate subject behavior can allow for subjects putting different weight on
outliers and taking into account the spread in the answers that they see. Expanding the regres-
sion in this way does not signicantly affect the estimates for the average weights that subjects
apply to the information that they observe.
To accurately describe subject behavior, it is necessary to model subjects as perceiving their
own answers as being of different quality than those of the other Thais they observe. I model a
subject to perceive her own MSE to be a fraction c of another Thai's. Where 2Sq is a subject's
perceived MSE for question q,
2Sq = c
2
Tq . (1)
If subjects are overcondent, they perceive themselves to be better than other Thais, so that
c < 1.4
Dene yiq to be the nal answer that individual i gives after observing information about
question q. For the case where subjects see nA American answers (xAq;1 through xAq;nA) and
nT Thai answers (xTq;1 through xTq;nT ), a subject's objective function is:
E(MSE) = E(yiq   Truthq)2
E (T (xTq;1 + :::+ xTq;nT ) + A(xAq;1 + :::+ xAq;nA) + sxiq   Truthq)
2
where
S = weight for own information
T = weight for any one piece of Thai information
A = weight for any one piece of American information
Assuming independence between the American and Thai group biases and that the weights
given to all information sum to one, the expressions in Proposition 3 below capture the weights
that subjects would optimally use. Both of these assumptions are conrmed by the experimen-
tal data. The expressions below dene optimal behavior conditional on any level of overcon-
dence.
Proposition 3 The following expressions dene the MSE-minimizing weights that subjects should
4This modeling of overcondence corresponds to the idea that a subject perceives her condence interval to be c
times the width of another Thai's, for any given signicance level. For experimental evidence on overcondence, see
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbolting (1991), Grifn and Tversky (1992), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), and Hoelzl
and Rustichini (2005). For eld evidence on overcondence, see Barber and Odean (2001), Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003), and Daniel et al. (1998).
use to evaluate information:
Weighing self relative to other Thais:
S
T
=
1
c
+
1  c
c

T
1  T

nT (2)
Weighing self relative to Americans:
S
A
=

2A
2T

1  A
c
+
A
c
nA

(3)
Weighing Americans relative to other Thais:
A
T
=

2T
2A

1 + (nT   1)T   c2TnT
(1 + (nA   1)A)(1  T )

(4)
Proof. See the appendix.
Equation (4) gives the weight ratio that subjects should assign to an American answer rela-
tive to an observed Thai answer. Not surprisingly, subjects should put higher weight on Amer-
ican information when 2A is low relative to 2T . Also when A is low and T is high, subjects
should put higher relative weight on American information.
The overcondence parameter enters the expression in a second-order way through the
c2TnT term. When overcondence is high (c is lower), subjects put more weight on Americans
relative to observed Thais because an overcondent subject trusts her perception of the com-
mon Thai information for a given question more than another Thai's perception. Another way
to think of this idea is that overcondent subjects already put high weight on Thai information
through the high weight they give to themselves. A Thai who is overcondent but otherwise
rational will then put higher weight on observed Americans than on observed Thais.
Notice also that increases in A only cause subjects to put less weight on individual Ameri-
can answers when nA is greater than one, but increases in T cause subjects to put less weight
on observed Thais even when only one Thai is observed. When one Thai is observed, there are
two Thai answers to consider: a subject's own answer and the one she observes. As a result,
the Thai group bias term enters (4) when nT = 1, but the American group bias term only enters
when nA > 1.
The experimental data on how subjects update their answers provide estimates of the actual
weights that subjects use. While the experiment does not directly observe subjects' perceptions
of 
2
T
2A
, T , and A, the following sections show how subject behavior makes it possible to test a
variety of hypotheses relating to subjects' implicit perceptions.
4 Summary Statistics
The data show that, across questions, Thais tend to make one kind of mistake and Americans
tend to make their own kind of mistake. This group bias means that American information
contains extra value for a Thai subject. As an example of what the data look like, Figure 3
shows kernel density estimates for the Thai and American answers for the questions about
January temperature in Bangkok and Boston. Panel 1 shows that Americans have a mean of
20C for the Bangkok temperature (correct answer = 32C) and Panel 2 shows that Thais have
a mean answer of 20C for the Boston January temperature (correct answer = 2C).
It is important to note that other questions show a different pattern than the question about
January temperature. For other questions, the American average is not as close to the correct
answer to the US question and the Thai average is not as close to the correct answer to the
Thailand question. Also, for some questions, the American and Thai averages for the sum
question are either both above or both below the correct answer. The extra value of information
from the other group is thus not an artifact of the experimental design. Thais have more to
learn from Americans than from other Thais because, across questions, the American and Thai
answer distributions are in different places. In other words, Americans and Thais make different
kinds of mistakes and this fact creates a greater opportunity to learn from the other group than
from one's own group.
Across questions, the data provide estimates of the average Thai-to-American MSE ratio for
each of the three types of questions. For the questions about Thailand,
c2T
2A
is 0:517, meaning
that the expected squared distance between a randomly selected American answer and the
correct answer is about twice as large as the expected squared distance between a randomly
selected Thai answer and the correct answer. I will describe this kind of result as Thais being
Notes:
(1) Epanechnikov kernel estimates
with optimal bandwidth selection
(2) Vertical lines correspond to
the correct answers
Figure 3:  Kernel density estimates for American and Thai answers about January temperature
Panel 1:  January temperature in Bangkok
(Correct answer = 32°C)
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twice as accurate as Americans for the questions about Thailand. Table 1 summarizes the
relative Thai-to-American accuracy for each of the three question types. The estimates in Table
1 come from the 116 Americans and the 430 Thais who either never observed anyone else's
answers or who answered the questions before observing other subjects' answers.5
5Thai subjects were informed that the answers they observed came from MIT students and Thammasat-Rangsit
students. So if subjects had different perceptions about Thammasat-Rangsit than the universe of all Thai subjects
in the experiment, it would be appropriate to use only the 130 Thai students from Stage 1 to calculate variances
and correlations. Limiting the calculations to the Stage 1 students has almost no effect, and certainly no signicant
effect, on the parameter estimates.
Question type
(1) (2)
Type 1 (Questions about Thailand) .341 .517
(.008) (.018)
Type 2 (Questions about US) .755 3.086
(.013) (.216)
Type 3 (Questions about the sum) .565 1.299
(.01) (.052)
Table 1: Relative accuracy of Americans and Thais
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
2
2 2
Thai MSE
Thai MSE  US MSE
T
T A
∆
=
+ ∆ + ∆
2
2
Thai MSE
US MSE
T
A
∆
=
∆
Consider the second column in Table 1. Thais have about one-half the MSE of Americans
for the questions about Thailand. Americans are three times more accurate for the questions
about the US and about 1:3 times more accurate for the sum questions. These ratios exactly
describe the weights that a subject should use if group bias did not matter. For the sum
questions, for example, a subject should put 1:3 times more weight on any observed American
answer than she puts on any Thai answer. The data will show that group bias means that
a subject should actually put about twice as much weight on American answers than on Thai
answers.
The experimental design also enables me to estimate the share of group bias in total MSE
for each question type, both for Americans and for Thais. The group bias share expresses
what fraction of the mistakes that subjects make can be attributed to the common group error.
Table 2 displays the estimated group bias shares for each question type. Column (1) contains
estimates of the Thai group bias share and column (2) contains estimates of the American group
bias share for each question type.
Estimated Thai Estimated American
Question type group bias share (ρT ) group bias share (ρA )
(1) (2)
Type 1 (Questions about Thailand) .234 .307
(.066) (.056)
Type 2 (Questions about US) .362 .227
(.088) (.063)
Type 3 (Questions about the sum) .336 .277
(.081) (.062)
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
Table 2: Group effects for Americans and for Thais
Table 2 shows that each group's bias share is higher for the question types that the group
knows less well. For Thais, group bias is responsible for the smallest share, 23%, of total MSE
for the Bangkok/Thailand questions and the largest share, 36%, for the Boston/US questions.
In contrast, group bias is responsible for the smallest share of total American MSE for the
Boston/US questions and the largest share for the Bangkok/Thailand questions. For example,
Thais make small errors about the average high daily January Bangkok temperature and group
bias causes a small share of that error. On the other hand, Thais make much larger errors
for the January Boston temperature, and a larger share of their mistakes comes from the fact
that the group mean for Thais was 20C. As I show in Section 6, the fact that Thai group
bias is biggest for the Boston/US questions has important implications for how a subject would
optimally behave when she sees information for the sum question only.
To summarize, the distributions of Thai and American answers show signicant group biases
for each group for each type of question. The presence of Thai group bias means that American
answers have extra value to a Thai subject. An optimizing Thai subject needs to account for
group bias when deciding how to weigh the American information she observes compared to
the Thai information she observes.
5 Estimating Subject Behavior
A regression of subjects' nal answers after observing information on the initial answers they
gave before observing information and the answers that they observed gives estimates of the
average weights that subjects put on American answers (A), other Thai answers (T ), and
her own initial answer (S). To make answers comparable across questions, I standardize
each answer by dividing by the mean of the American and Thai standard errors for any given
question. I also include dummy variables for the three categories of questions: geography,
economics/politics, and demography. Where
yiq = (standardized) nal answer given by subject i for question q,
xiq = (standardized) initial answer given by subject i for question q,
xiAq = (standardized) average observed American answer for question q,
xiT q = (standardized) average observed Thai answer for question q,
Cq = vector of dummy variables for question category for question q,
I estimate the following regression equation:
yiq = Sxiq + AxiAq + TxiT q + C
0
qq + "iq (5)
Optimal behavior implies that a subject would choose different weights for the American and
Thai average when she observes different amounts, niA and niT , of observed American and
Thai information. When a subject observes more American answers, a higher weight should
be assigned to the American average since it contains more information. A high American
group bias share, though, means that there is less new information in each additional American
answer and that a subject should put less weight on each individual American answer when she
sees more of them. To see how subjects actually do change the weights they give to information
depending on how much they observe, I include terms to account for this in the regression. In
addition, if subjects have some knowledge of the group MSEs for individual questions, they will
apply higher weight to American information for those questions that Americans answer better
relative to Thais. To see if subjects behave this way, the regression can also be expanded to
include a term that captures relative group accuracy across questions. Details and results for
additional specications that I consider beyond (5) are contained in the appendix.
The basic results, obtained by estimating (5) for each of the three types of questions, are
summarized in Table 3.
Actual weight Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
Own initial answer (β S ) .653 .464 .731
(.016) (.02) (.019)
Thai average (β T ) .238 .09 .068
(.02) (.03) (.02)
American average (β A ) .056 .463 .165
(.012) (.019) (.024)
N 1008 1053 557
Notes:
(a) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(b) These estimates come from the regressions in columns 1, 5, and 9 of Table A1.
Table 3:  Summary of estimated weights
For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects put a weight of 0:653 on their private beliefs,
0:238 on the observed Thai average, and 0:056 on the observed American average. Thus, the
model estimates that subjects assign 4:2 times more weight to the observed Thai answers than
to American answers for the Bangkok/Thailand questions. When subjects observe information
about the Boston/US questions, they assign approximately 5:1 times more weight to American
answers than to other Thai answers, choosing 0:464 as the weight for their initial answers, 0:090
for the weight given to observed Thai answers, and 0:463 for the weight given to observed
American answers. When subjects observe answers for the sum question, the regression
estimates that they assign 2:4 times more weight to American answers than to observed Thai
answers, giving estimates of 0:731 for the own-weight, 0:068 for the Thai weight, and 0:165 for
the American weight.
The results shown in Table A1 in the appendix also indicate that subjects account for different
group accuracies across questions. For all three types of questions, subjects put signicantly
more weight on American information for those questions on which Americans perform relatively
better. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, an increase of 0:1 in the accuracy index (Thai MSE
divided by the sum of American and Thai MSE) causes subjects to increase the weight given to
American answers by 0:02. Given that subjects assign a weight of 0:058 to American answers,
this represents a substantial increase. To compensate for putting more weight on American
answers, subjects put less weight on their initial answers for those questions where American
answers are particularly valuable.
It may seem surprising that subjects are able to appreciate the accuracy of Americans rela-
tive to Thais for individual questions. That they do is perhaps less surprising when the individual
questions are considered. Relative to American answers, Thai answers are much more accu-
rate for the question about temperature in Bangkok than for the question about female-labor
force participation in Thailand. Apparently understanding this fact, the Thai subjects put higher
relative weight on Thai information for the question about Bangkok weather.
It is important to note that subjects improve their earnings considerably by changing their
answers after observing information. Compared to what they would have earned with the an-
swers they gave before observing information, subjects earn 14% more on the questions about
Thailand when they observe information about those questions, 58% more for the questions
about the US, and 24% more for the questions about the sum.
6 Tests for Optimal Behavior
The model described in Section 3 provides estimates of the optimal weights that a subject
should use. These estimates come from substituting the estimates of the American-to-Thai
MSE ratio, the American group bias share, and the Thai group bias share into equations (2),
(3), and (4). Panel A of Table 4 displays these estimates of the optimal weights given that c = 1,
that subjects on average consider their own answers as being no more or less accurate than
the answers given by the Thais they observe.
For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, a subject should apply a weight of 0:245 to her initial
answer, 0:480 to the Thai average she observes, and 0:274 to the American average she ob-
serves. For the Boston/US questions, the corresponding weights are 0:087, 0:168, and 0:745.
For the sum questions, the model estimates that a subject would optimally choose 0:146 for the
self-weight, 0:300 for the weight given to observed Thai answers, and 0:554 for the weight given
to observed American answers. Bootstrapping gives the standard errors for these estimates.
Optimal weight Questions about Thailand Questions about US Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3)
Own initial answer (β S ) .245 .087 .146
(.007) (.008) (.009)
Thai average (β T ) .480 .168 .300
(.014) (.015) (.02)
American average (β A ) .274 .745 .554
(.021) (.024) (.028)
Notes:
(a) The estimates come from the parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2.
(b) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4:  Estimating the optimal weights
6.1 Construction of Condence Intervals
Simulations using the regression coefcients and their variance-covariance matrix obtained by
estimating (5) give a condence interval for AT , the weight ratio that expresses how subjects
actually weigh American compared to Thai information. Also, the distributions of Thai and
American answers make it possible to generate condence intervals for weight ratios under
different hypotheses that could be driving subject behavior. I focus on condence intervals for
two such weight ratios: 1) the simple weight ratio, which expresses how a subject would behave
if she understood each group's accuracy but ignored group bias, and 2) the optimal weight
ratio described in equation (4), which expresses how a subject would behave if she correctly
perceived each group's accuracy and accounted for group bias. The parameter estimates in
Tables 1 and 2 give condence intervals for the simple weight ratio and for the optimal weight
ratio for any value of the overcondence parameter c.
To summarize, I consider the following three weight ratios:
Actual =
A
T
Simple =

2T
2A

Optimal =

2T
2A

1 + (nT   1)T   c2TnT
(1 + (nA   1)A)(1  T )

Table 5 reports condence intervals for these three ratios for each of the three question
types. The p-values in the table correspond to tests that I describe in the next subsection.
Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
Actual weight ratio .231 5.143 2.49
(.131,.352) (3.144,15.17) (1.45,5.366)
Simple weight ratio .517 3.086 1.299
(.477,.554) (2.737,3.577) (1.205,1.406)
p=0.000 p=0.065 p=0.017
Optimal weight ratio
   c  = 1 .571 4.423 1.843
(.475,.694) (3.467,5.63) (1.466,2.332)
p=0.000 p=0.622 p=0.346
c = 0.25 .616 5.125 2.135
(.468,.798) (3.662,7.592) (1.525,2.991)
p=0.000 p=0.986 p=0.676
Notes:
(a) Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses.
(b) The bootstrap for the actual weights accounts for correlation in the coefficient estimates.
(c) p -values compare the given weight ratio to the actual weight ratio.
Table 5:  Comparing how subjects relatively weigh American and Thai information
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The optimal weight ratio increases substantially due to group bias. The optimal weight ratio
also increases as overcondence increases, but not as much. Even for very large overcon-
dence, the direct effect of group bias on the optimal weight ratio is larger than the effect of
overcondence. Consider the Boston/US questions. With no overcondence, the presence of
group bias causes the optimal weight ratio to increase from 3:09 to 4:42. Increasing overcon-
dence by dropping c to 0:25 causes the optimal weight ratio to further rise to 5:04.6
6The data can also be used to estimate c using a nonlinear model, but the standard errors on the resulting
estimates are large. The estimated value of c falls between 0:20 and 0:45, on average, with condence intervals that
are too wide to draw rm conclusions about the true value of c.
6.2 Hypothesis Tests
By looking at how subjects weigh American information relative to observed Thai information, I
can test a variety of hypotheses relating to subjects' perceptions about the accuracy of American
answers relative to Thai answers and the extent of group bias for each group. Consider the
hypothesis, H0, that subjects correctly perceive the accuracy of Thais relative to Americans, but
ignore group bias. Under this hypothesis, subject behavior will reect the following perceptions:
H0 :

2T
2A

perceived
=

2T
2A

, (T )perceived = 0, (A)perceived = 0 .
Under H0, as shown in Section 3, subjects will choose
A
T
=

2T
2A

. (6)
Rejection of the prediction (6) implies rejection of H0.
The second row of Table 5 displays the results of testing for the equality of the ratios in
equation (6) for all three types of questions. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions and the sum
questions, we can reject equality at the 5% level (p = 0 and p = 0:017, respectively). For the
Boston/US questions, we can reject it at the 10% level (p = 0:065). We reject the hypothesis
for the Bangkok questions due to subjects choosing too low a weight for American answers
relative to Thai answers. It is rejected for the Boston/US and sum questions due to subjects
relatively overweighing American answers. For all three types of questions, subjects do not
correctly perceive how accurate Americans are relative to Thais while at the same time failing
to recognize the importance of group bias.
Now consider the hypothesis of optimal behavior, H1:
H1 :

2T
2A

perceived
=

2T
2A

, (T )perceived = T , (A)perceived = A
This hypothesis states that subjects correctly perceive the MSE of Thais relative to Americans
and also correctly account for group bias. Under H1, subjects understand each group's accu-
racy and correctly value the independence in American information. Compared to a subject who
behaves according toH0; a subject who behaves according toH1 will put more weight on Amer-
ican answers because she appreciates the value of an American's independent perspective to
a Thai subject.
Under H1, subjects will choose the optimal weight ratio
A
T
=

2T
2A

1 + (nT   1)T   c2TnT
(1 + (nA   1)A)(1  T )

(7)
Table 5 displays the results of the above test for a variety of possible values of the overcon-
dence parameter. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, H1 is rejected. For all values of over-
condence, the test gives a p-value of nearly zero. Thais put too little weight on American
answers in this case, the one in which they need the least help at answering the questions.
On the other hand, for the Boston/US and sum questions, we cannot reject H1 for any level of
overcondence.7 For c = 1, the optimal weight ratio estimates are 4:42 and 1:84, compared to
the actual weight ratio estimates of 5:14 and 2:49. Tests of equality give p-values of 0:622 and
0:346, respectively.
Now consider the optimal weight ratios for the Boston/US and sum questions when over-
condence is taken into account. Given c = 0:25, the actual and optimal weight ratios match
up quite closely. For the Boston/US questions, the optimal weight ratio estimate is 5:13 and the
actual weight ratio estimate is 5:14. The test for equality between the two, not surprisingly, gives
a p-value of nearly one (p = 0:986). For the sum questions, the optimal weight ratio estimate
is 2:14, compared to the actual weight ratio of 2:49 (p = 0:676). In summary, individuals who
weigh their initial answers more heavily than answers given by other Thais, as the experimental
subjects do, would optimally weigh American answers relative to Thai answers in a very similar
way to how the subjects actually behave.
7It is interesting that the Thai subjects fail to use the optimal relative weights only for the questions about Bangkok
or Thailand. They should put a high weight on observed Thais compared to observed Americans, but they choose
an even higher relative weight than they optimally would. Given that subjects use the optimal weights for the sum
questions, which include the Thailand questions, it seems likely that the Thailand heading for the questions about
Thailand causes subjects to underweigh American information. In other words, only when the question is clearly
about a Thai's area of expertise do the subjects listen too little to Americans.
Biased behavior, however, could still explain subject behavior for the Boston/US and sum
questions. Under this hypothesis, H2, subjects perceive Americans to be better than they
actually are compared to Thais and they ignore group bias:
H2 :

2T
2A

perceived
>

2T
2A

, (T )perceived = 0, (A)perceived = 0
UnderH1, subjects put extra weight on American information because they understand the extra
value in American information that comes from the fact that Americans and Thais make different
kinds of mistakes. Under H2, subjects put extra weight on American information because they
incorrectly perceive American answers to be better than they really are.
7 Do Subjects Value the Independence in Outside Information?
The presence of the sum questions makes it possible to distinguish betweenH1 andH2. Specif-
ically, the test that distinguishes between these hypotheses uses the data generated by the case
in which subjects observe information about the sum question only. Consider the following ex-
ample of what one group of subjects observed for the question about political leaders:
Since January 1, 1960,
number of American
presidents
______ + ______ = ______
1.    35
1.    10
2.    12
3.    17
Answers given by Thai students
Answers given by American students
Figure 4:  Sample of information that subjects observe
Since January 1, 1960,
number of Thai prime
ministers
Sum
Subjects who observed the above information had to use it to update their answers for
both the question about Thai prime ministers and the question about American presidents. By
looking at how subjects separately update their answers for the Thailand question and the US
question, it is possible to test the hypothesis that subjects ignore group bias when accumulating
the knowledge that the observe.
To explain this test, I expand the earlier notation that applied when each question type was
considered separately. Dene:
j;k = group bias share in total MSE for group j for question type k
2j;k = mean-squared error for group j for question type k
For example, T;US is the group bias share in total MSE for Thais answering the Boston/US
questions.
Consider the case when a subject uses observed answers for the sum question to up-
date her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand questions. A subject updates her answer for the
Bangkok/Thailand question based on the distance between the answers she observes for the
sum question and her initial answer for the sum question. When a subject observes answers
above her own for the sum question and uses them to update her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand
question, she is likely to revise her answer upwards.
Dene

A
T

Thai
to be the weight ratio that subjects assign to American answers relative
to Thai answers to the sum question when they update for the Bangkok/Thailand question.
Analogously, dene

A
T

US
to be the weight ratio that subjects assign to American answers
relative to Thai answers to the sum question when they update for the Boston/US question.
Consider the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If
 
T;Thai

perceived
=
 
T;US

perceived
= 0, then a subject who observes informa-
tion for the sum question will choose

A
T

Thai
=

A
T

US
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 refers to a subject who implicitly perceives there to be no Thai group bias for
both the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions. When observing information about the
sum question, this subject will use the same weight ratio to update for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions as she uses to update for the Boston/US questions.
Consider the hypothesis, G0, that the perceived group bias shares are zero.
G0 :
 
T;Thai

perceived
=
 
T;US

perceived
= 0
This hypothesis states that subjects ignore Thai group bias for both the Bangkok/Thailand and
Boston/US questions. Notice that rejection of G0 would imply rejection of H2, the hypothesis
that subjects perceive Americans to have lower MSE relative to Thais than they actually do and
ignore group bias. In other words, since rejection of
 
T;Thai

perceived
=
 
T;US

perceived
= 0
implies rejection of (T )perceived = 0 for any question type, rejection of G0 means we must also
reject H2.
Under G0, subjects will choose 
A
T

Thai
=

A
T

US
(8)
The left-hand side of (8) represents the weight ratio subjects use to relatively weigh American
and Thai answers for the sum question to revise their answers for the Thailand questions. The
right-hand side of (8) represents the analogous ratio that subjects use to update for the US
questions. Rejection of the equality in (8) would imply rejection of G0.
The following two regressions give the parameter estimates needed to conduct a test of the
equality of the ratios in (8). The rst equation expresses the change in a subject's answer for
the Thai question as a function of the distance between the average observed American answer
for the sum question and her own answer for the sum question and the distance between the
average observed Thai answer for the sum question and her own answer for the sum question.
The second equation expresses how subjects update their answers for the US question after
observing information relating to the sum question.
Where
yiq;Thai = nal answer given by subject i to the Bangkok/Thailand part of question q,
xiq;Thai = initial answer given by subject i to the Bangkok/Thailand part of question q,
yiq;US = nal answer given by subject i to the Boston/US part of question q,
xiq;US = initial answer given by subject i to the Boston/US part of question q,
xiq;Sum = initial answer given by subject i for the sum part of question q,
the regression equations are:
yiq;Thai - xiq;Thai = A;Thai(xiAq;Sum - xiq;Sum) + T;Thai(xiT q;Sum - xiq;Sum) + C 0q1 + "iq1(9)
yiq;US - xiq;US = A;US(xiAq;Sum - xiqs;Sum) + T;US(xiT q;Sum - xiq;Sum) + C 0q2 + "iq2(10)
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equations (9) and (10). Notice that

̂AbT

Thai
=
:075
:056 = 1:34 and

̂AbT

US
= :226:081 = 2:79. The regression results provide the inputs needed to
test the equality in (8). We can reject equality at a 10% level (p = 0:058). At a 10% level, we
thus reject G0, the hypothesis that subjects fail to take group bias into account, regardless of
how they perceive American and Thai accuracy.
In contrast, correctly accounting for group bias would lead subjects to behave in a simi-
lar way to how they actually do behave. If the perceived group bias share for Thais for the
Boston/US questions (T;US) is greater than the perceived group bias share for Thais for the
Bangkok/Thailand questions (T;Thai), then subjects will put a higher relative weight on observed
Americans for the US questions than for the Thailand questions. The proof of Proposition 4
demonstrates that:
Ta > Tt )

A
T

Thai
<

A
T

US
To understand the intuition, consider a subject updating her answer for the question about
Thailand after observing information about the sum question. If Thai group bias for the ques-
tions about Thailand (T;Thai) is high, she should put less weight on Thais relative to Americans
because each additional Thai answer contains little new information. On the other hand, if
Dependent variables : (1) Final answer for Thai question
(2) Final answer for US question
Regression weights Thailand questions US questions
(1) (2)
      =  Distance between observed Thai average .056 .081
and initial answer (for sum question ) (.013) (.019)
      =  Distance between observed American average .075 .226
and initial answer (for sum question ) (.014) (.022)
p-value for test of
N 548 544
Notes:
(a) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(b) Regressions include dummies for question categories (meteorology, economic/political, and demography).
Table 6:  Updating for the Thai and US questions after observing answers for the sum
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Figure 5:  Optimal behavior when information for the sum question
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Thai group bias for the Boston/US questions (T;US) is high, she should put higher weight on
observed Thai answers for the sum question. When T;US is high, Thai subjects have a better
idea of what other Thai answers about the sum mean for what those observed students believe
about the Thai question. For example, if T;US was equal to one, all Thais would give the same
answer to the US question. Then, a subject could exactly deduce an observed Thai's private
belief about the Bangkok/Thailand question from her answer to the sum question.
The data show that the effects of group bias can explain how subjects actually weigh the
information they observe. If subjects applied the estimated actual variance estimates and esti-
mated actual group bias shares from Tables 1 and 2, they would choose

̂AbT

Thai
= 1:51 and
̂AbT

US
= 2:53, similar ratios to the estimates of optimal behavior of 1:34 and 2:79. Figure 4
shows how the optimal weight ratios for the two types of questions vary as a function of T;US ,
holding the other parameters constant at their estimated values. The gure shows that, when
updating their answers for the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects should put less weight on
Americans answers to the sum question relative to Thai answers when T;US is high.
In summary, the earlier results showed that subjects used approximately the optimal weight
ratio for the Boston/US and sum questions. We could explain this behavior in two ways. Either
subjects appreciate the importance of group bias or subjects overestimate 
2
T
2A
, the ratio of Thai
MSE to American MSE. The ways in which subjects update for the Bangkok/Thailand and
Boston/US questions when they observe answers for the sum question supports the former
hypothesis. Subjects appear to appreciate each group's accuracy and the extra value in an
American's independent perspective to a Thai subject.
8 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that economic agents can learn effectively from a diverse set of in-
formation. The Thai subjects attain signicant improvements in their answers by correctly
weighing observed American answers relative to observed Thai answers. Moreover, subject
behavior shows that agents can be expected to account for not only the relative quality of differ-
ent information sources, but also the value of drawing on a variety of independent perspectives.
Part of the subjects' success in the experiment may derive from Thailand's openness to
foreigners and relatively positive view of the US. In contrast, only 15% of Indonesians had a
favorable impression of the US around the time that I conducted this experiment (Pew Research
Center, 2003).8 It may be the case that, in general, Indonesian decision-makers would have
a more difcult time optimally using information from Americans due to their more negative
feelings toward the US. For this and other reasons, it is unclear to what extent the results in this
paper apply across cultures. Future research could apply this experimental design to students
from other countries to determine the generality of my results.
The results illustrate the importance of forming diverse groups to solve problems. Unfor-
tunately, the desire for cohesiveness often prevents diverse groups from being formed. Psy-
8The US invasion of Iraq is largely responsible for the feelings of Indonesians towards the US. In 2000, 75% of
Indonesians had a favorable view of the US. In 2002, 61% of Indonesians still viewed the US favorably.
chological evidence suggests that homogeneous groups become close-knit more easily (Janis,
1972). As homogeneous groups become more close-knit, they believe more in the group's
invulnerability, creating a cycle in which the group becomes increasingly more close-knit and
insulated from outside information. The problem thus appears to come from poorly functioning
groups as opposed to poorly functioning individuals. Subject behavior in the experiment indi-
cates that when agents listen to a diverse group of opinions, they can be expected to carefully
consider the available information. The key is to make sure that decision-makers hear those
independent voices.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From the denition of the MSE for group j for question q:
2jq =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
(xijq   xjq + xjq   Truthq)2
Expanding the expression gives:
2jq =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1

(xijq   xjq)2 + 2(xijq   xjq)(xjq   Truthq) + (xjq   Truthq)2

Since xjq = 1Nj
NjX
i=1
xijq, the middle term drops out, giving the result:
2jq =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
(xijq   xjq)2 + (xjq   Truthq)2 = s2jq + 2jq
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider group j (either A or T ). For a given question q, the MLE for the true mean-squared
error (MSE) of group j answers is:
c2jq = 1Nj
NjX
i=1
(xijq   Truthq)2 (11)
Where xjq is the average answer for group j members for question q, the MLE for the sample
variance, s2jq, is
s2jq =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
(xijq   xjq)2 (12)
Since the sample variance is the part of total MSE that does not come from group bias and the
MLE of a function is the function of the MLEs, the sample variance can be expressed as:
s2jq = (1  bjq)c2jq
Substitution of (11) into (12) then gives
1  bjq =
NjX
i=1
(xijq   xjq)2
NjX
i=1
(xijq   Truthq)2
) bjq =
NjX
i=1
(xjq   Truthq)2
NjX
i=1
(xijq   Truthq)2
=
d2jqc2jq
Since the questions are assumed to be independent, the MLE for j is the mean of bjq
across questions. Likewise, the MLE for
c2A
2T
is the mean of
d2Aq
2Tq
across questions.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Assuming that nTT + nAA + s = 1 so that the sum of the weights put on all pieces of
information is one, the expected value of a subject's MSE can be expressed as:
E(MSE) = E
 
T
nTX
k=1
(xTk   Truth) + A
nAX
k=1
(xAk   Truth) + s(xs   Truth)
!2
.
Also assume the group biases are uncorrelated, so that
E((xTkT   Truth)(xAkA   Truth)) = 0,
as holds true in the experimental data. Then expanding the expression for MSE gives
E(MSE) = nT
2
T
2
T + nT (nT   1)2TT2T + nA2A2A + nA(nA   1)2AA2A
+2cnTTsT
2
T + c
2
T
2
T
Taking derivatives with respect to the weights gives the expressions in Proposition 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the case when a subject uses observed answers for the sum question to update her
answer for the Bangkok/Thailand question. When she observes nA American answers and nT
Thai answers, her expected mean-squared error is
E(MSE) = E (T ((xTs1   xis) + :::+ (xTsnT   xis)) + A ((xAs1   xis) + :::+ (xAsnA   xis)) + xit   t)
2
= E
 
T
nTX
k=1
("Ttk + "Tak) + A
nAX
k=1
("Atk + "Aak)  (nTT + nAA)("it + "ia) + "it
!2
= nT
2
T

(2Tt +
2
Ta) + (nT   1)(Tt2Tt + Ta2Ta)

+
nA
2
A[
2
At +
2
Aa + (nA   1)(At2At + Aa2Aa)] +
(1  nTT   nAA)22Tt + (nTT + nAA)22Ta + 2(1  nTT   nAA)nTTTt2Tt
 2(nTT + nAA)nTTTa2Ta ,
where A is the weight given to American answers for the sum question and T is the weight
given to other Thai answers for the sum question.
Taking the derivatives with respect to A and T gives the optimal weights. The ratio
A
T
can
be expressed as a function of the optimal weight ratios derived in Proposition 2 for how sub-
jects should weigh American information relative to Thai information for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions and the Boston/US questions:

A
T

Thai
and

A
T

US
. The optimal weight ratio is

A
T

Thai
=

A
T

Thai
+

A
T

US
yA
yT
+
cnT
2
Ta(Tt Ta)(1 Ta)
yT
1 + yAyT
1 Tt
1 Ta
+
cnT
2
Ta(Ta Tt)
yT
,
where yA = (1+(nA 1)Aa)(1 Ta) and yT = (1+(nA 1)At)(1 Tt). If the perceived group
bias shares for Thais for the Thailand and US questions, Tt and Ta, are zero, this reduces to
the following expression: 
A
T

Thai
=
2Tt +
2
Ta
2At +
2
Aa
The same line of reasoning implies that, if Tt and Ta are zero,
A
T

US
=
2Tt +
2
Ta
2At +
2
Aa
This equation gives the desired result:
(Tt)perceived = (Ta)perceived = 0)

A
T

Thai
=

A
T

US
B Questionnaire
Below is a list of the fteen questions used in the experiment. The questions appeared accord-
ing to the format in Figure 1.
Questions: Group 1
1. At the equator, the sun sets 12 hours after it rises on any day.  In other places, the day is longer
than 12 hours in the summer and shorter than 12 hours in the winter.  Length of longest day in
Bangkok? Boston? Sum?
2. In 2002, highest recorded temperature in Bangkok? Boston? Sum?
3. From 1961-1990, average number of days with recordable precipitation (of any type) in
Bangkok? Boston? Sum?
4. From 1961-1990, average daily high temperature in Bangkok? Boston? Sum?
5. Distance between Bangkok and Boston?
Questions: Group 2
1. The per capita gross national product (GNP) is a measure of the annual mean income that is
earned per person in a country.  So per capita GNP is the total income of a country divided by
the number of people in that country (including adults and children).  In 2002, per capita GNP
of Thailand? US? Sum?
2. 2002 population of Thailand? US? Sum?
3. Since January 1, 1960, number of Thai prime ministers? US presidents? Sum?
4. On October 1, 2003, average price of a liter of premium gasoline in Bangkok? Boston? Sum?
5. On October 1, 2003, average Thai baht-to-US dollar exchange rate?
Questions: Group 3
1. In 2002, percentage of Thai women aged 15-24 infected with HIV? US women? Sum?
2. In 2002, percentage of Thai workers who were women (average for the year)?  US workers?
Sum?
3. In 2002, percentage of Thais aged 25-29 with at least some university education? Americans?
Sum?
4. In 2002, percentage of Thais whose primary occupation was in agriculture? Americans? Sum?
5. In 2000, percentage of Thais who reported they were of Chinese ethnicity? Americans of
African ethnicity? Sum?
C Additional Regression Results
The regression can be expanded to include terms that account for the number of answers that
subjects observe, the accuracy of Americans relative to Thais, and the spread in the observed
answers. To account for accuracy, for example, I use Accq =
b2Tqb2Aq+b2Tq . When Accq is high,
Americans are better relative to Thais at answering the question q. Table A1 reports the results
of expanding the regression in a variety of ways.
Dependent variable:  Subjects' final answers
Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subject's initial answer .653 .654 .65 .662 .464 .474 .48 .492 .731 .731 .731 .728
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.018) (.02) (.02) (.021) (.021) (.019) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Initial answer * number of observed .002 .008 .004 .003 .001 .013 .001 -.001 -.001
         American answers (.019) (.019) (.019) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024)
Initial answer * number of observed -.038 -.04 .041 .045 -.002 .002
         Thai answers (.019) (.019) (.024) (.024) (.026) (.026)
Initial answer * accuracy index -.142 -.273 -.266
(.084) (.127) (.13)
Thai average .238 .242 .242 .24 .09 .086 .054 .064 .068 .07 .064 .076
(.02) (.021) (.025) (.026) (.03) (.03) (.036) (.036) (.02) (.025) (.028) (.032)
Thai average * number of observed .004 .002 .012 -.015 -.004 .003 .006 .011 .008
         American answers (.024) (.024) (.025) (.034) (.035) (.038) (.03) (.031) (.03)
Thai average * number of observed .001 -.002 -.053 -.038 -.024 -.017
         Thai answers (.025) (.026) (.038) (.041) (.037) (.037)
Thai average * accuracy index .04 -.123 -.151
(.098) (.221) (.204)
American average .056 .049 .039 .063 .463 .481 .476 .455 .165 .092 .088 .081
(.012) (.014) (.015) (.016) (.019) (.02) (.021) (.021) (.024) (.037) (.037) (.038)
American average * number of observed -.016 0 -.003 .075 .09 .07 -.07 -.069 -.061
         American answers (.017) (.019) (.019) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.032) (.032) (.032)
American average * number of observed -.036 -.027 -.046 -.053 -.023 -.012
         Thai answers (.018) (.018) (.024) (.024) (.025) (.025)
American average * accuracy index .232 .398 .351
(.055) (.124) (.139)
Number of observations 1008 986 986 986 1052 1032 1032 1032 557 548 548 548
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories (geography, economics/politics, and demography).
Questions about US Questions about sum
Table A1:  Expanded regression results
Questions about Thailand
C.1 Testing for Anchoring
To test for anchoring, I consider the following regressions:
(yiq   xiT q)2 = 1TAnchori + V ersion0iv2T + "iq (13)
(yiq   xiAq)2 = 1AAnchori + V ersion0iv2A + "iq, (14)
The rst (second) regression looks at the distance between subjects' nal answers and the Thai
(American) answers they observe. Anchori is a dummy that is one of the 42 subjects in the
anchoring group, and V ersion0iv is a vector of dummy variables for the 20 sets of information that
subjects could have observed. Including the version dummies creates a comparison between
the anchoring group subjects and main group subjects who observed the same information.
If subjects anchor, then 1T < 0 and 1A < 0, so that subjects who do not provide their
private beliefs before observing answers end up closer to those observed answers than subjects
who answer the questions on their own rst. The coefcients are always close to zero and
insignicant except for the distance from the American average for the Boston/US questions.
Dependent variables: (1) Squared distance from observed Thai answers
(2) Squared distance from observed American answers
Independent variable: Dummy for anchoring treatment group
Distance from
Thai answers
Distance from
American answers
(1) (2)
Questions about Thailand -.013 .042
(.021) (.078)
Questions about the US -.051 -.046
(.065) (.022)
Questions about sum -.026 -.049
(.049) (.07)
Note: Regression standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A2:  Testing for anchoring
